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CONFISCATORY RATES AND MODERN FINANCE
Juius HENRY COHEN
What rate of return must be allowed -before a publicly regu-
lated rate is held to be confiscatory?
May the regulatory body in fixing the rate consider the actual
result flowing from a low interest rate to bondholders and low
dividend rates to preferred stockholders?
May it consider the actual rather than the nominal return to
the common stockholders?
May it consider the holding company factor in any given situa-
tion?
The recent discussion in the comprehensive prevailing and
dissenting opinions in the O'Fallon case' renews consideration
of the legal theories and the technique of procedure for ascer-
tainment of what is or is not a confiscatory rate fixed for a busi-
ness devoted to a public use. How far has the United States
Supreme Court committed itself? Is it true than an 8,o over-
all return on the rate base is now guaranteed by the decisions
of that court? It is undoubtedly of signal importance to both
investors and consumers that the groundwork shall be carefully
surveyed so that wise prognostication may be made. Already
a commission in New York is at work studying the important
phases of public utility regulation. What is the present state
of the law on the rate of return on the rate base? This paper is
confined to a limited field: A study of the United States Supreme




Court decisions with a view to determining what is likely to
be the "judicial process" by which in the future the line will be
drawn between confiscatory and non-confiscatory rates. To make
the point of inquiry graphic, we start with the following illus-
trative situations:
The value of a given plant is found (under now sustainable
theories of valuation for rate-making purposes) to be, we will
assume, $100,000,000. The fact-finding body finds that the out-
standing bond issue at 5% is $75,000,000; that the preferred
stock is $10,000,000, paying 6 %; that the current rate of
return on common stock in such an enterprise is 8%. Must
the consumers pay a rate which, after all deductions including
reserves for depreciation, ensures 8% net on the $100,000,000,
or $8,000,000 annually?
If the return must be 8% on the $100,000,000, then the com-
mon stockholders do not receive 8% on their property, they re-
ceive in fact 24%. Deduct from $8,000,000 the 5% payable to
the $75,000,000 bondholders, $3,750,000, and the 61/2% payable
to the $10,000,000 preferred stockholders, $650,000, a total of
$4,400,000, and there is left $3,600,000 for $15,000,000 common
stockholders, distributable annually, or a return of 24% per
annum on their property.
Assuming, however, the more normal set-up, by which,
through use of the device of the holding company, the $15,000,-
000 of common is broken up, the interest and dividend obligation
payable out of the $8,000,000 collected from consumers will
now more likely appear to be as follows:
The same $4,400,000 is payable to bondholders and preferred
stockholders of Company A; but the $15,000,000 held by the
common stockholders is transferred to holding company B, and,
by exchange of stock and refinancing, Company B securities are
split up into $5,000,000 of bonds at 5 %, $5,000,000 of pre-
ferred stock at 61/2%, and $5,000,000 of common. This requires
a debt and interest service, in addition to the $4,400,000 of
Company A, of $275,000 payable annually to the bondholders of
B and $325,000 payable to the preferred stockholders of B, a
total requirement of $5,000,000-leaving a net $3,000,000 from
the $8,000,000 revenue to be distributed to the $5,000,000 of
common, or more than 60% per annum as return on their prop-
erty.
2
2 That none of these figures is exaggerated is shown by the following
statemenb of the Federal Trade Commission in SEN. Doc. No. 213, 69th
Cong. 2d Sess., at 24:
"By the device of financing the holding companies quite heavily with
bonds and preferred stocks at lower rates, the common-stock equities of the
holding companies, ownership of which is retained by the promoters, are
made to earn much higher rates.
"Certain holding-company interests for which published consolidated
balance sheets and income statements are available for 1924 and 1925
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A 3suming that the original stockholders continue their hold-
ings, and that the original cash put into the plant was not
$100,000,000, but $50,000,000, the present $100,000,000 value
resulting from the consideration given to "going value," "recon-
struction value," "good will," etc., then for the original $50,000,-
000, the annual obligations for interest and dividends would be:
5% payable to $35,000,000 bondholders, $1,750,000, and 6 % /
payable to $7,500,000 preferred stockholders, $487,500, a total
of $2,237,500. To $7,500,000 common stock then would be dis-
tributed the difference between the $8,000,000 revenue and the
amount payable to prior security holders, i. e., $5,762,500, ap-
proximately 77% per annum.
Or if organized into a holding company, the $7,500,000 com-
mon would be reduced to $1,500,000. After payment of 5 to
$4,000,000 of bondholders of the holding company and 6 ,%
to $2,000,000 of preferred stockholders, there would be $5,432,-
500 for distribution annually to $1,500,000 of common stock, or
approximately 360% per annum.
II
To what extent have factual situations such as these been
presented to the United States Supreme Court?
(a) The Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case.3 (Opinion
of the court by McReynolds, J.) The Court calculated the base
value of the property involved at $25,000,000 and the annual
net profits on operations available for depreciation and return
as $2,828,617.60, approximately 11 1/3% on $25,000,000. On
the record presented the Court sustained a finding of 6% loss
per annum for depreciation. So there was left only a 5 1/3%
return upon "the minimum value of the property," which the
Court says is too low "considering the character of the invest-
ment and interest rates then prevailing." ' It is clear that so
far as this case goes no fixed interest return to the investor is
guaranteed. On the contrary, there must be considered the
interest rates then prevailing. The only testimony in the case,
as appears from the record, as to what rate was needed for in-
show rates of earnings on common-stock equities, after paying interest on
borrowings and diviAends on preferred stocks, ranging from 19 per cent
to 55 per cent in !-'-:!4 and from 21 per cent to 40 per cent in 1925. Un-
questionably the o: iortunity of making such high rates of profit on the
common-stock equ;ities furnishes the primary economic motive actuating
promoters of +"-- present e.xtensive holding-company movement in the
electric power i- iustry."
s Missouri e% -. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
* Ibid. 288, 43 Sup. Ct. at 546.
* Record, Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 568, fol. 955.
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ducing new capital to enter came from an investment banker in
St. Louis, who stated that in his opinion at that time not less
than 10% return was necessary to secure neN# capital for the
company. In its argument for a rehearing the company said:
"The Court cannot ignore the fact that municipal bonds,
exempted from all forms of taxation, state and national, are
producing more than 6.81% upon the net proceeds of such bonds.
The public press contains advertisements from day to day of
industrial bonds of well-established businesses offered at a price
to produce from 82% to 10%, and this is the return to the
investor and not the per cent which the company floating the
bonds is to pay upon the amount actually received." 0
It was argued that there were but two ways open to the com-
pany to obtain the money needed as capital: one was by the
sale of stock and the other by the sale of bonds. To reach the
investor he must be assured (1) that his money is safe, (2)
that his money will earn in the telephone business as much as
or more than it will earn in other established lines of business
in which he is able to invest. If he was offered in the locality
first mortgage notes at 8%, he could hardly be expected to buy
telephone stock paying 6.81%. By the same token, if it be shown
that first lien securities sell on a basis of 5 to 5 %, and pre-
ferred stock in well established companies on a basis of 7 or 8%,
can it be argued that the stockholders are entitled to receive
10% return on all the money required, as though it were all
issued for common stock?
There is nothing in the Telephone Company case, either in the
majority or minority opinion, which will embarrass the Supreme
Court in the slightest degree when the issue is squarely presented
in making an analysis and comparison of interest and dividend
rates, breaking them up as is usually done by bankers and in-
formed investors. With strict adherence to the rule in Smyth
v. Ames for determining value for the rate base, the Court will,
it is fair to prophesy, when it comes to determining the rate,
base its determination upon what the record discloses is such
a net return to common stockholders as is customary and neces-
sary to attract that kind of capital to the enterprise. This is
the only return which is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Brandeis, J., points out in the Telephone Company case:
"The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that
its charges to the.public shall be reasonable. His company is
the substitute for the state in the performance of the public
service; thus becoming a public servant. The compensation
which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the
reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes not
only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital
6 Ibid. 76, fol. 145.
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charges cover the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of
the capital, whatever the nature of the security issued therefor;
the allowance for risk incurred; and enough more to attract
capital. The reasonable rate to be prescribed by a commission
may allow an efficiently managed utility much more. But a
rate is constitutionally compensatory if it allows to the utility
the opportunity to earn the cost of the service as thus defined." T
Nothing in the majority opinion is contra to this. The dif-
ference between Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., and their brethren
is a difference over the method to be pursued in asccrtaining
the base value. Nor is the following analysis by Brandeis, J.,
questioned:
"To decide whether a proposed rate is confiscatory, the
tribunal must determine both what sum would be earned under
it, and whether that sum would be a fair return. The decision
involves ordinarily the making of four subsidiary ones:
"1. What the gross earnings from operating the utility under
the rate in controversy would be. (A prediction)
"2. What the operating expenses and charges, while so
operating, would be. (A prediction)
"3. The rate-base, that is, what the amount is upon which
a return should be earned. (Under Smytlh v. Ames, an opinion,
largely)
"4. What rate of return should be deemed fair. (An opinion,
largely)
"A decision that a rate is confiscatory (or compensatory) is
thus the resultant of four subsidiary determinations. Each of
the four involves forming a judgment, as distinguished from
ascertaining facts. And as to each factor, there is usually room
for difference in judgment. But the first two factors do not
ordinarily present serious difficulties." 8
The difference between the judges is a difference over the
method for ascertaining the value for the rate base. There is
no difference over the method of ascertaining what is a fair re-
turn. What is a fair return depends upon "the character of the
investment and interest rates then prevailing."
How, in the face of these decisions, can a court say that com-
mon stockholders of a public utility must earn 24 or 30% or
50%, or even 10% net on their property? Of course, on the
basis of its past decisions, the Court will say that the common
stockholder's investment today is not the actual cash lie in-
vested in the plant twenty-five years ago-if he is still the holder
-- but it is his aliquot share of the property at its Present value.
But even so, is not 24% far beyond a fair and reasonable return?
Even adding a percentage for depreciation, still, if the financial
set-up be studied, analyzed and properly considered before the
7 Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
supra note 3, at 290, 43 Sup. Ct. at 547.
8 Ibid. 291, 43 Sup. Ct. at " "
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actual dividend return is considered, it may not be 8% on the
total rate base. The fundamental error in the past seems to
have been to argue in terms of a lump percentage upon a lump
valuation, disregarding the factor familiar to every banker and
investor that when you borrow money at 5% and earn 8% with
it, you are making 3% on the borrowed money and not on the
plant itself. This profit on money borrowed, as distinguished
from the profit on money invested, is one that so far as the
writer can discover has been argued and briefed in but one
case presented to the Supreme Court.9
(b) McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.0 In the McGardle
case the Commission found that as of May 31, 1923, the value
of the property used by the company was not less than $15,260,-
400; that the annual return under existing rates would be ap-
proximately $800,000; that 7% was a reasonable rate of return.
The Commission made an order, effective January 1, 1924,
prescribing a schedule increasing some of the rates.
"In its report it stated that the rates authorized might not
produce a seven percent return for the immediate future; but
it expressed belief that on the average over a period of approxi-
mately three years the schedule would produce an adequate re-
turn." 11
£he court below found that
"1... the amount as found by the commission was less than the
fair value of the property as of January 1, 1924, by more than
$3,500,000, and that 'the fair value of complainant's said prop-
erty at said time was and is not less than $19,000,000, and that
the water rates imposed in that order ... are too low and are
confiscatory of complainant's said property.' "112
It enjoined the enforcement of the order. The Supreme Court
held, on the record in that case, "that the value of the
property as of January 1, 1924, and immediately following,
was not less than $19,000,000," and affirmed the decree.
Taking a valuation of $19,000,000 and deducting from it the
funded debt of $8,231,000 13 leaves in round figures'a value for
9 See Pacific G. & E. Co. v. San Francisco, infra note 58.
10 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
II Ibid. 402, 47 Sup. Ct. at 145.
12 Ibid. 403, 47 Sup. Ct. at 146.
13 The record showed the following financial set-up of the company
(Record, McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 250-256, fol. 302-304):
Outstanding common stock ............................. $5,000,000
Funded debt: 51% bonds ................ $4,500,000
4Y% bonds ............... 3,731,000
8,231,000
To meet the debt service required:
Interest on 5%,l% bonds ................................ $247,500
4 ol% bonds ............................... 167,895
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the common stock of $10,770,000. A net return of $515,600
for these stockholders would be less than 5.5%. An exhibit in
the case showed that on the company's base valuation of $18,-
641,000 the return on the whole investment would be less than
5.1%.4 Judge Geiger below concluded his opinion by saying:
"I am not confronted with the problem of fixing a valuation
within the range of dispute upon spot reproduction... because
the complainant comes into this Court and offers to accept $19,-
000,000 as a fair basis of valuation, even though, as it says, and
I think has reason to say, and could support it, it could, upon the
record, sustain a higher valuation. That will be the finding, and
it follows, I think without dispute-without the possibility of
serious dispute-that, that being so, the rates or the tariffs or
charges that have been promulgated by the respondent Com-
mission, no matter what figure of measuring it, what rate of
measuring it, we adopt, provided it be above five per cent, that
schedule will not satisfy the constitutional requirements of the
plaintiff in this case...." 2
It appears clearly that neither the Commission nor the Su-
preme Court was called upon to pass upon the question we
raised at the outset of this paper. However, in the various
opinions of the Court are found statements which do have im-
portant bearing upon that question. In speaking of the value
of the property which was to be taken as the rate base, the
Court referred to the then high level of prices and wages, and
said:
"And we may take judicial notice of the fact that there has
been no substantial general decline in the prices of labor and
materials since that time. The trend has been upward rather
than downward." 16
For amortization ...................................... 15,000
Other interest charges ................................. 2,000
$432,395
Net earnings, after deducting depreciation allowances and
taxes, were computed at: ............................ 958,000
Deduct interest on funded debt .......................... 432,400
z525,00
2 Record, 255, fol. 304. It did appear in the case that of the company's
outstanding stock and bonds $4,500,000 of common stock and $3,000,000 of
bonds were issued as dividends to common stockholders (Record 283-292,
327, fol. 337-342, 381) ; but in view of the fact that the Commission itself
had ignored that fact and eleven months prior to the finding under review
had held the property to be worth $16,450,000 for purposes of authorizing
a new bond issue, even if this huge increment to common stockholders in-
fluenced the Commission in fixing the rate base, it did not influence the
court below (see opinion, Record 106-9, fol. 61-2) and the Supreme Court
upheld the court below.
15 Record 64, fol. 112.
is McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 10, at 412, 47 Sup.
Ct. at 149 [Italics ours].
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The majority of the Court (per Butler, J.) said:
"It is obvious that rates of yield on investments in bonds plus
brokerage is substantially less than the rate of return required
to constitute just compensation for the use of properties in the
public service. Bonds rarely constitute the source of all the
money required to finance public utilities. And investors insist
on higher yields on stock than current rates of interest on
bonds. Obviously, the cost of money to finance the whole enter-
prise is not measured by interest rates plus brokerage on bonds
floated for only a part of the investment." 17
It is clear from this that, when the facts are properly presented,
neither the majority nor minority of the Court will refuse to
consider facts which establish in a given case that the enterprise
can be financed on less than an average of 7%.
Elsewhere in the opinion, Mr. Justice Butler said:
"But in determining present value, consideration must be
given to prices and wages prevailing at the time of the investiga-
tion; and, in the light of all the circumstances, there must be an
honest and intelligent forecast as to probable price and wage
levels during a reasonable period in the immediate future." l
To do this is, of course, difficult. If railroad and interstate
commerce commissions could make such prophecies with ac-
17 Ibid. 419, 47 Sup. Ct. at 151.
is Ibid. 408, 47 Sup. Ct. at 147 [Italics ours].
The method by which the Court approaches the problem of determining
present value is indicated as follows:
"It is well established that values of utility properties fluctuate, and
that owners must bear the decline and are entitled to the increase. The
decision of this court in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 547, declares that
to ascertain value 'the present as compared with the original cost of con-
struction' are, among other things, matters for consideration. But this
does not mean that the original cost or the present cost or some figure
arbitrarily chosen between these two is to be taken as the measure. The
weight to be given to such cost figures and other items or classes of evidence
is to be determined in the light of the facts of the case in hand. By far
the greater part of the company's land and plant was acquired and con-
structed long before the war. The present value of the land is much
greater than its cost; and the present cost of construction of those parts
of the plant is much more than their reasonable original cost. In fact,
prices and values have so changed that the amount paid for land in the
early years of the enterprise and the cost of plant elements constructed
prior to the great rise of prices due to the war do not constitute any real
indication of their value at the present time [citing cases]. Undoubtedly,
the reasonable cost of a system of waterworks, well-planned and efficient
for the public service, is good evidence of its value at the time of con-
struction. And such actual cost will continue fairly well to measure the
amount to be attributed to the physical elements of the property so long
as there is no change in the level of applicable prices. And, as indicated
by the report of the commission, it is true that, if the tendency or trend
of prices is not definitely upward or downward and it does not appear
probable that there will be a substantial change of prices, then the present
value of lands plus the present cost of constructing the plant, less deprecia-
tion, if any, is a fair measure of the value of the physical elements of
the property." Ibid. 410, 47 Sup. Ct. at 148 [Italics ours].
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curacy, then, indeed, their opinions would furnish a most profit-
able base for stock investors. But it is not "accuracy of fore-
cast" which is required but a reasonable look ahead, based upon
the evidence submitted. 9
The method employed is equally applicable to the considera-
tion of interest and dividend rates. The utterances of both the
majority and minority of the Court would scarcely leave room
for any doubt that upon a proberly presented case (such as we
illustrated at the beginning of this paper) the Court would
adopt the same method for determining the rates to be charged
by utility companies to consumers.
Such facts as have been recently developed by the Federal
Trade Commission and such examples as we have given of div-
idend returns to those who hold common stock as compared
with interest returns have not as yet been brought before the
Supreme Court for consideration. We may be sure that investors
will be allowed a return on a rate base which includes such in-
creases in value of the property used as may be shovm by the
record. They will, therefore, participate in the general rise of
price levels or real estate values; but by the same token they
take the risk, as the Court has frequently pointed out, of a drop
in values.
The "prudent investment theory" has failed to incorporate
itself into the law of the land. 0 When prices are sky-rocketing,
the consumer will pay high rates. When price levels go down,
the investor will lose his high return. There is no certainty
either way, argues Mr. Justice Brandeis, though, as he says,
reasonable certainty is most needed. But even when prices are
on a high level, must the consumer pay rates which will return
dividends to coinmon stockholders in well established utilities
as high as 20, 30, 40, 50 and even 1505? So far as we have
been able to discover, there is no constitutional provision and
neither Supreme Court decision nor dictum which guarantees
the common stockholder any such return.
(c) Bluefield Water Works case.2 1 The opinion of the Court
here, as in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case, is by
19 "In every confiscation case, the future, as well as the present must be
regarded. It must be determined whether the rates complained of are
yielding and will yield, over and above the amounts required to pay taxe3
and proper operating charges, a sum sufficient to constitute just compensa-
tion for the use of the property employed to furnish the service; that is,
a Teasonable Tate of return on the -alute of the property at the timro of tho
investigation and for a reasonable time in the immediate future." Ibid.
408, 47 Sup. Ct. at 148 [Italics ours].20 See Brandeis, dissenting, in Southwestern Bell Telephone case, mSpra
note 3, at 310, 311, 43 Sup. Ct. at 554.
21Bluefield Water Works & Improv. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262
U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923).
19291
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Butler, J. (Brandeis, J., concurring for the reasons stated by
him in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case). The rule
is stated as follows:
"What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends
upon many circumstances and must be determined by the ex-
ercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all
relevant facts. A public utility is entitled to such rates as will
permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it
employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same general part of the
country on investments in other business undertakings which
are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has
no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or antic-
ipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.
The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence
in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate,
under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary
for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return
may be reasonable at one time, and become too high or too
low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money
market and business conditions generally." 22
This rule is deduced from an analysis of previous cases which
portend clearly, it would seem, that, when presented, the Court
will not ignore the financial set-up of the company, together
with such evidence as will establish the then market rates upon
which capital may be secured.23  The Court will consider the
22 Ibid. 692, 43 Sup. Ct. at 679.
23 See ibid. 693-4, 43 Sup. Ct. at 679. The Court cited Willcox v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., infra note 25, in which it had
"1... held that the question whether a rate yields such a return as not
to be confiscatory depends upon circumstances, locality and risk, and that
no proper rate can be established for all cases; and that, under the cir-
cumstances of that case, 6 per cent was a fair return on the value of the
property employed in supplying gas to the city of New York, and that a
rate yielding that return was not confiscatory. In that case the invest-
ment was held to be safe, returns certain and risk reduced almost to a
minimum-as nearly a safe and secure investment as could be imagined
in regard to any private manufacturing enterprise."
It referred to its decision in the Cedar Rapids case (Cedar Rapids Gas
Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389 (1912)):
"This Court declined to reverse the state court where the value of the
plant considerably exceeded its cost, and the estimated return was over
6 per cent.
"In 1915, in Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 172, 35
Sup. Ct. 811, this court declined to reverse the United States district court
in refusing an injunction upon the conclusion reached that a return of
6 per cent per annum upon the value would not be confiscatory.
"In 1919, this court, in Lincoln Gas & E. L. Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S.
256, 268, 39 Sup. Ct. 454, declined on the facts of that case to approve
a finding that no rate yielding as much as 6 per cent on the invested
capital could be regarded as confiscatory."
Referring to Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923)
the Court said:
"The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit sustained, as against
the attack of the city on the ground that it was excessive, 7% per cent.
[Vol. 39
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ability of the company to borrow money on low rates of interest
or to raise capital on low dividend rates. It will, as it has re-
peatedly said, consider the factual situation in each case. A
new, untried company may be entitled to higher rates because
it must pay more for its money than one solidly established.
But it may be observed that if the rates of solidly established
companies are sufficiently low, new companies will not be able
to charge high rates in competition.
The Court found from the record in the case that:
".... the rate of return has been low through a long period
up to the time of the inquiry by the commission here involved.
For example, the average rate of return on the total cost of the
property from 1895 to 1915, inclusive, was less than 5 per cent;
from 1911 to 1915, inclusive, about 4.4 per cent, without allow-
ance for depreciation. In 1919, the net operating income was
approximately $24,700, leaving $15,500, approximately, or 3.4
per cent on $460,000 fixed by the commission, after deducting
2 per cent for depreciation. In 1920, the net operating income
was approximately $25,465, leaving $16,265 for return, after
allowing for depreciation. Under the facts and circumstances
indicated by the record, we think that a rate of return of 6 per
cent upon the value of the property is substantially too low to
constitute just compensation for the use of the property em-
ployed to render the service." 24
The Commission fixed $460,000 as the base valuation. It found
that under existing rates, assuming some increase of business,
gross earnings in 1921 wu.ld be $80,000 and operating expenses
$53,000, leaving $27,Ou[,. the equivalent of 5.875, or 3.87%
after deducting 2% aii--.-ed for depreciation. It held existing
rates insufficient to the -tent of $10,000. It allowed the com-
pany an increase of 161 on 805 of its bills, a net increase of
about 12.8% or $10,24:. Its order was sustained by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The United States
Supreme Court rever. .d the lower court. Adding $10,240 to a
net of $27,000 would give the company $37,240 on $460,000-a
too low valuation. As the United States Supreme Court was not
called upon to pass upon an increased valuation, it did not go
into the capital set-up of the company. Nothing whatever is
said upon this phase of the matter. The whole discussion turns
upon the proper rule to be applied for ascertaining the value
for basing the rate, i. e., the rate base.
The court below had held that it could not review the finding
of facts of the Commission. But the Supreme Court held that
found by a special master and approved by the district court as a fair
and reasonable return on the capital investment-the value of the prop-
erty"f,
24 Bluefield Water Works & Improv. Co. v. Public Service Comm., upra
note 21, at 695, 43 'Sup. Ct. at 679.
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this was error because the record clearly showed that the Com-
mission, in arriving at its final figure, did not accord proper, if
any, weight to the greatly enhanced cost of construction.
(d) Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 2 5 In 1906, the Legis-
lature of New York passed the Eighty Cent Gas Law. An
eighty cent rate was found to yield 6%. On application for an
injunction to restrain enforcement of the rate upon the ground
that it was confiscatory, the court below granted the injunction.
The Supreme Court reversed the court below and held the statute
constitutional. Such utterances as are made in the case are all
favorable to the opinions expressed in this article.
"The evidence shows that from their creation, down to the
consolidation in 1884, these companies had been free from legis-
lative regulation upon the amount of the rates to be charged
for gas. They had been most prosperous and had divided very
large earnings in the shape of dividends to their stockholders,
dividends which are characterized by the Senate committee, ap-
pointed in 1885 to investigate the facts surrounding the con-
solidation, as enormous. The report of that committee shows
that several of the companies had averaged, from their creation,
dividends over 16 per cent, and the six companies in the year
1884 paid a dividend upon capital which had been increased
by earnings, as in the case of the Manhattan and the New York,
of 18 per cent; and, had it been upon the money actually paid
in, it would have been nearly 25 per cent." 21
The court below found the value of the tangible assets actually
employed at the time of the commencement of the company's
suit in the business of supplying gas to be $47,831,435, to which
it added $12,000,000 as the value of the company's franchise.
The Supreme Court disallowed this $12,000,000. Altering the
flilding of the court below as to the rate base by allowing a
franchise valuation of but $7,781,000, the Court fixed the total
valuation for rate making at $55,612,435, upon which 6% would
be $3,336,746.10. On an eighty cent rate the Court figured a
return of $3,024,592.14, "which is nearly 51/2 per cent on the
above total of $55,612,435." 27
But what is the rule for determining the rate of return to in-
vestors in fixing the rates to be chiarged to consumers? Peckham,
J., writes for the entire court:
"There is no particular rate of compensation which must in
all cases and in all parts of the country be regarded as sufficient
for capital invested in business enterprises." 28
25 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192 (1909). Opinion of the Court by Peck-
ham, J. All concurred.
26 Ibid. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. at 197.




How are we to find the proper rate?
"Such compensation must depend greatly upon circumstances
and locality; among other things, the amount of risk in the
business is a most important factor, as well as the locality where
the business is conducted and the rate expected and usually
realized there upon investments of a somewhat similar nature
with regard to the risk attending them.... The less risk, the
less right to any unusual returns upon the investments. One
who invests his money in a business of a somewhat hazardous
character is very properly held to have the right to a larger
return without legislative interference than can be obtained
from an investment in government bonds or other perfectly
safe security. The man that invested in gas stock in 1823 had
a right to look for and obtain, if possible, a much greater rate
upon his investment than he who invested in such property in
the city of New York years after the risk and danger involved
had been almost entirely eliminated.
"In an investment in a gas company, such as complainant's,
the risk is reduced almost to a minimum. It is a corporation,
which in fact, as the court below remarks, monopolizes the gas
service of the largest city in America, and is secure against
competition under the circumstances in which it is placed, be-
cause it is a proposition almost unthinkable that the city of
New York would, for purposes of making competition, permit
the streets of the city to be again torn up in order to allow the
mains of another company to be laid all through them to supply
gas which the present company can adequately supply. And,
so far as it is given us to look into the future, it seems as cer-
tain as anything of such a nature can be, that the demand for
gas will increase, and, at the reduced price, increase to a con-
siderable extent. An interest in such a business is as near a
safe and secure investment as can be imagined with regard to
any private manufacturing business, although it is recognized
at the same time that there is a possible element of risk, even
in such a business.. .. Under the circumstances, the court [be-
low] held that a rate which would permit a return of 6 per cent
would be enough to avoid the charge of confiscation, and for
the reason that a return of such an amount was the return
ordinarily sought and obtained on investments of that degree
of safety in the city of New York." 20
The testimony of experts for the appellants, while indicating
that in their opinion a return of 6% was liberal, gave it also as
their opinion that the company would not have "the slightest
difficulty in floating at par all the five per cent bonds and all
the stock bearing six per cent dividends" that might be required
for new construction.30 On this record, the Supreme Court was
fully justified in its conclusions. Here again, as in the three
preceding cases, the real issue in the case presented to the Su-
preme Court concerned the matter of valuation and 7zot the de-
termination of the interest return
SIbd.o
-o lRecord, WI-oox v. Consolidiated Gas Co., at; 2350.
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(e) Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston31 This case is cited
by counsel for the water company in the MeCardle case as sup-
porting generally an 8% return on the rate base. The case did
not so hold. It involved the five cent fare on the street railway
system of Galveston. The suit was brought to enjoin the fare,
it being claimed by the company that it was confiscatory. The
City of Galveston claimed that the rate was sufficient to yield
the company an 8% return on the value of the property used
in the public service. The court below refused an injunction.
The Supreme Court sustained the court below, Brandeis, J., de-
livering the opinion of the Court. All that the Court said on
the 8% return was this:
"It is thus clear that, both in the year ending June 30, 1920,
and in the calendar year 1920, the net earnings of the system
were less than 8 per cent of its value, whether the value be
estimated on the basis of prudent investment or on the basis
of the reproduction cost actually adopted. When the court ren-
dered its decision the ordinance had been tested for more than
a year and a half-a period ample in ordinary times to test the
current effect of the rate prescribed and to indicate its probable
effect in the near future. The times here involved were, however,
in a high degree abnormal. It did not follow that, because the
system had earned less than 8 per cent in 1919 and in 1920, it
would earn less than 8 per cent in 1921 32. . [The District
Judge's] determination whether the prescribed rate would be
confiscatory was necessarily based largely on a prophecy, for
normal conditions had not been restored. He found that gross
revenues were steadily increasing; and that they were larger
under the 5-cent fare than they had been during the preceding
year when the 6-cent rate was in effect. He was convinced that
operating costs would decrease largely during the year. His two
opinions show that every element upon which his proijhecy
should be based received careful consideration. We cannot say
that the evidence compelled a conviction that the rate would
prove inadequate." -
Again:
"We know judicially that the period has, in general, been one
of continuous price recession, and that the current rates of re-
turn on capital are much lower than they then were. But we
cannot know to what extent the important changes occurring
have affected either gross revenues or the net return." 31
(f) Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln.35 This is another case cited
by counsel for the company in the McCardle case to support a
general rate return of 8%. The case involved the Lincoln, Neb-
31 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922).
32 Ibid. 400, 42 Sup. Ct. at 356.
3 Ibid. 401, 42 Sup. Ct. at 357.
34Ibid. 402, 42 Sup. Ct. at 357.
35 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454 (1919).
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raska, one dollar gas rate ordinance, which the company claimed
was confiscatory. It brought a bill to restrain enforcement of the
ordinance. Upon final hearing, the court dismissed the bill. The
Supreme Court affirmed this decision, Pitney, J., on this occasion
writing the opinion of the Court. All that the Supreme Court
felt called upon to say with reference to the interest return
below which rates would be found to be confiscatory was the
following:
"We cannot approve the finding that no rate yielding as much
as 6 per cent upon the invested capital could be regarded as
confiscatory, in view of the undisputed evidence, accepted by
the master, that 8 per cent was the lowest rate sought and gen-
erally obtained as a return upon the capital invested in banking,
merchandising and other business in the vicinity; 7 per cent be-
ing the 'legal rate' of interest in Nebraska. Complainant had
not such a monopoly nor were its profits 'virtually guaranteed'
in such a sense as to permit the public authorities to restrict it
to a return of 6 per cent upon its invested capital. It is not
entirely clear, however, that the rate ordinance did so restrict
it.I. "
(g) 'In Smyth, v. Ames, 37 Mr. James C. Carter reviewed the
status of the decisions up to that time (1897). His review indi-
cated that prior to that time no occasion had as yet arisen for
such an analysis by the Supreme Court as we have here sug-
gested. Up to 1904 there had been no intimation from the Court
in terms of interest return of how the Court ajplied the rule of
"unreasonable" return. But in 1904 .when interest returns we.re
notoriously low and it then appeared to the Supreme Court that
much of the capital in a company was invested twenty and
thirty years before, Mr. Justice Peckham could take judicial
notice of prevailing investment returns and could say, in the
Stnislaus (7 3e, for the whole Court:
"To be a:le still to realize 6 per cent upon the money originally
invested is more than most people are able to accomplish in
any ordinary investment, and more than is necessary in order to
give just compensation for property at the time it is used for
the public purpose originally intended." 38
In 1909, the Court again took judicial notice of the prevailing
interest rates and said (per Mloody, J.) in the Knoxville case:
"Upon any aspect of the evidence the company is certain to
obtain a substantial net revenue under the operation of the ordi-
nance. The net income, in any event, would be substantially 6
36Ibid. 267, 39 Sup. Ct. at 457.
87 169 U. S. 466, 514,'515 (1898).
ss Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. R. Canal & L Co., 192 U. S.
201, 216, 24 Sup. Ct. 241, 247 (1904).
19291
YALE LAW JOURNAL
per cent, or 4 per cent after an allowance of 2 per cent for de-
preciation." 30
(h) Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co.40 The earlier case of
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co 4 1 dealt with the 1906 eighty
cent gas law over the period of 1906 to 1908, at which time a
6% rate return was held to be adequate. Newton v. Consolidated
Gas Co. dealt with the same eighty cent gas law, but on the basis
of conditions for the eight months preceding January 1, 1919.
The Supreme Court took judicial notice "of the enormous in-
crease in cost of labor and materials since this court declared
that appellee might possibly earn 6 per centum under the 80-
cent rate." The master found, as to the results of actual opera-
tions during all of 1918 and the first eight months of 1919, that:
"On the basis of the prices, rates of pay, and costs prevailing
during the eight months beginning January 1, 1919, the cost
of making and distributing gas has been such as to allow a
very small, if any, return, on even the actual investment; and
since September 1, 1919, the cost of making and distributing gas
has been increased in a number of respects so that the fair infer-
ence is that the complainant company now finds itself without
any return upon the investment." 42
This portion of the master's finding of fact was adopted by the
Supreme Court, all concurring, Mr. Justice McReynolds writ-
ing the opinion, and Mr. Justice Clarke concurring in the result.
By way of caution, the Court said at the end of its opinion:
"It seems proper to add that we do not intend by anything
said herein to intimate what would have been a reasonable rate
for the sale of gas under the circumstances disclosed." '3
In short, the decision of the Supreme Court is that, on the basis
of the record, the eighty cent gas act was unconstitutional as
applied to the Consolidated Gas Company. Nothing is said in
the decision about 8% or any other per centum. Obviously,
since the Court had found that, on the basis of eighty cents the
company could not even earn any return on its actual invest-
ment, it was not necessary to the case to do more than to hold
that the act was confiscatory.
In the court below, however, it was said by Learned Hand, J.:
"The evidence in this record indicates that 8 per cent. is the
going rate at the present time, and that stands uncontradicted.
39 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 17, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 164
(1909).
40258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264 (1922).
41 Supra note 25.
42 Supra note 40, at 171, 42 Sup. Ct. at 265.
43 Ibid. 178, 42 Sup. Ct. at 268.
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For many months past the United States, certainly the most sol-
vent debtor in the world, has paid either 6 or nearly 6 per cent.,
and other governments higher. As the facts develop in this case,
I 'need not find any rate, except to say that less than 6 per cent.
woud be insuff cient. I have made findings based upon both 6
per cent. and 7 per cent."44
In passing, Hand, J., made the following observations:
"If the rate is to correspond with the market, 7 per cent.
would scarcely seem too high, and at least so much appears to
have been taken as the standard in Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas Co.,
supra, the last declaration of the court."'
Examination of the decision in the Lincoln case makes it clear
that, precisely as it had done with the eighty cent gas law, the
United States Supreme Court confined its decision to the facts
in the case before it. It did not intend to make 7,% a standard.
In an earlier sentence Hand, J., seems to have accurately ap-
prehended the meaning of the decision in the Lincoln case. He
said:
"In Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas Co., 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454,
the court indicated that changed conditions of investment might
change the rate. Eight per cent. was mentioned, though prob-
ably not as intended to cover the case of a sure monopoly such
as this was described to be in Willcox v. Con. Gas Co."
The actual situation as Hand, J., found it in the case before
him, was that taking the "tangibles" alone and valuing them
not on the estimate of experts, but on their cost, except in the
case of the land,
"... the company will not much more than earn upon them
5 per cent. on the basis of 1918 costs, or 31% per cent. on the basis
of 1919 costs. If the franchises are added, the earnings yfill
be 4 per cent. on the basis of 1918 costs and 3 per cent. on that
of 1919. As the 1919 prices have now obtained for over a
4 Consolidated Gas Co. of N. Y. v. Nevon, 267 Fed. 231, 241 (S. D.
N. Y. 1920). [Italics ours] Under the heading of "Reasonable Rate of
Return" the master had reported:
"Since the decision of the prior suit in 1909 (Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19) there has been a radical change in business condi-
tions. The investment market of the world is on an entirely different
basis than that under consideration by the court in 1909. Taking into
consideration all the factors 'hich the courts have indicated as entering
into the determination of a reasonable and proper return upon capital
employed in supplying gas to the public, I am of opinion that this com-
plainant company is entitled to receive a return of at least 8 per cent.
on the value of the property used in its gas business." Record, at 62.
It will be observed that this finding by the master was not supported by the
Distria Court nor by te United States Supreme Court, nor was it neces-
sary at all to the decision.




year and a half, it is fair to say that, in a long enough future to
call for some relief, the company cannot earn more than 31/
per cent. on its 'tangibles' 
alone." 4t
Based on competent expert testimony, the court doubted very
much if the company could earn more than 1112% on the tangibles
alone.
(i) In a footnote to his opinion in the Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. case,' Brandeis, J., calls attention to the fact that
since Smyth v. Ames the Supreme Court had up to 1922 dealt
with the validity (under the Fourteenth Amendment) of rate
regulation by the states in over fifty cases. Yet in only twenty-
five of these did the Court, he pointed out, pass upon the ques-
tion of whether a rate fixed or approved by a state commission
denied to the utility the opportunity of earning a fair return
upon the fair value of the property. In none of these twenty-
five cases had an order of a state commission, made after a full
hearing, been declared void by the Supreme Court, on the ground
that the finding of the rate base or value was too low. In none
.of them was the order declared void on the ground that the
commission fixed too low a percentage of return. He points out
further that though lower federal courts and state courts could
have occasionally intervened with effect, the instances were rela-
tively few as compared with the number of adverse decisions of
the commissions, and that even where orders fixing rates had
been set aside for irregularity or error, the result of the hear-
ing was not always advantageous to the company.
Not even the zealous advocates of high percentage of return
have gone so far as to contend that a fixed or certain percentage
return on the entire rate base is guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, regardless of interest rates or stock dividends prevailing.
In the very able brief filed by counsel for the public utility in
the McCardle case,' 9 though they start off bravely by saying,
"Regulation of rates should not be permitted to reduce below
eight per cent. the earnings of the private capital embarked in
the appellee's business," this is immediately qualified by the fol-
lowing:
"The national market for money, for industries and public
service enterprises, has become highly competitive, and the re-
turn must be such as to enable the utilities to secure in this
market the new money necessary for their business."
Counsel did go on to say "and eight per cent. has been widely
recognized as the customary and required rate." Even assum-
4TIbid. 269.
48 Supra note 3, at 296 n. 8, 43 Sup. Ct. at 549 n. 8.
49 Supra note 10.
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ing that the figure stated is correct (which on examination is
not supported by the cae cited),/o nevertheless there still re-mains the question we raise in this article, 85 on what? 3 on
capital borrowed at 5% or received from investors on preferred
and actually paying 6IA%? Counsel in the McCardle case inter-
preted the rule of the Bluefield 51 .case to be
f.... that the return to be allowed utility investors must
be determined by the competitive conditions of the money mar-
ket, so as to give them equality of treatment with investors in
other undertakings of corresponding risks and uncertainties." .2
Of course, but "utility investors" are not entitled, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to make 3 or 311.%1 profit on the money
they borrow from other investors on the bonds of their company.
They are entitled dnly, as the decisions hold, to a fair and reason-
able return, in the light of financial conditions, on their prop-
erty. And their property is the common stock. Or if it be
preferred, surely they are not entitled to more than the rate
they were willing to take as fixed in the contract.
The investor himself convincingly determines, by his actual
investment in the utility, what is a fair return. If he buys first
lien bonds at five, then he has established the fair rate of return
on his money, for the company will pay him no more so long
as the bonds run, or if he buys preferred at six, then six is the
fair return, for the same reason. If there is to be refunding, the
Commission can then determine the current rate to be paid on
the new securities. But when this rate of return is established
by contract between the company and the investor, why should
the consumer pay more in the rates charged? This splitting up
of the factual financial situation into its component parts (done
every day by bhnkers and investors) has not yet been done by
the Supreme Court except in one case.13
Brandeis, J., said in 1922, in his opinion in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. case:
"In speculative enterprises the capital cost of money is always
high; partly because the risks involved must be covered; partly.
because speculative enterprises appeal only to the relatively small
number of investors who are unwilling to accept a low return on
their capital. It is to the interest both of the utility and of the
50 See cupra sections a, c, e, f, and h, pp. 153, 159, 164, and 166.
51 Supra note 21.
2 Counsel in the HfcCardle case wound up their argument for an 8%
rule by saying: "It is impprtant to keep in mind that neither the Commis-
sion, the utility, nor the Court, can control what rate of return is required
to prevent starving the utility. That is determined by the invstor, "who
will not put in his money where it may be discriminated against. City of
Elizabeth v. Board of Pub. Utility Comm'r of N. J., 99 N. J. Law 496,
123 Atl. 358 (1924)." Appelle's brief, p. 120.
53 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, infra note 53.
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community that the capital be obtained at as low a cost as pos-
sible. About 75 per cent of the capital invested in utilities is
represented by bonds. He who buys seeks primarily safety. If
he can obtain it, he is content with a low rate of interest." "1
While all this was by way of argument against a fluctuating rate
base, it nevertheless is a true statement of fact, pertinent to our
present inquiry, one which, when presented at a time when the
Court is concentrating its attention upon the sole question of
percentage return, will be acceptable as a true statement by the
ehtire Court.
Indeed, it is not too much to infer that Brandeis, J., foresaw
the raising of such questions. For at another place in his
opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case he points
out that a plant built in times of low prices, at a cost of $1,000,-
000, with 59o thirty-year bonds to the extent of $750,000, might
later be held, under the prevailing opinion in the case, to have
a reproduction cost of $1,750,000. It would be, he said,
". .. a fantastic result to hold that a rate was confiscatory
unless it yielded 8 per cent on the then reproduction cost of
$1,750,000. For that would yield an income of $140,000, which
would give the bondholders $37,500; and to the holders of the
$250,000 stock, $102,500." 6r
The majority of the Court stands by the proposition decided
in the Minnesota Rate Cases:
"The making of a just return for the use of the property in-
volves the recognition of its fair value if it be more than its
cost. The property is held in private ownership, and it is that
property, and not the original cost of it, of which the owner
may not be deprived without due process of law." 6"
Accepting that rule in all its strength, it still remains true that
the percentage return to which the investor in common stock
is entitled is not a percentage on the total base rate valuation,
but such a percentage on his share of it, as, after deducting all
prior obligations for fixed interest or dividends on borrowed
money or capital in prior securities, will insure the owner of
the common stock his fair and reasonable return. And as for.
the bondholder or the preferred stockholder, they are entitled
only to what by contract they were willing to accept (or what
at the time of the inquiry is the current rate of return on such
securities).
It may be true that the original holders of common stock of
no par value in such cases as the McCardle case - share in the
54 Supra note 3, at 307, 43 Sup. Ct. at 553.
5 Ibid. 305, 43 Sup. Ct. at 552.
56 Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 762 (1913).
57 Supra note 10.
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increased values of the original property over the original in-
vestment, as they were shown to have done in the McCardle case,
to the tune of stock dividends of $4,500,000 of common, and $3,-
000,000 of bonds; but securities are now freely bought and sold
and continuity of ownership is the exception and not the rule.
There is an element of fairness in finding the value of the com-
mon tpday and safeguarding that property, for the owner of
today's stock, like the owner of today's real estate, may be ob-
liged to take a market value less, if it is less, and may get more,
if it is greater, than the original cost.
III
Pacific Gas & Electhic Co. v. City aid County of San Francisco"
(a) The decision in the case. The Pacific case involved the
constitutionality of the San Francisco 75 cent gas ordinance and
deals with the period of 1913 to 1916. The master and the
court below found that the ordinance was not confiscatory. The
Supreme Court reversed the court below. It rested its decision
upon two grounds: first, that a rate of 7% was justified upon
the record, and second, that the master had erred in failing to
include in the rate base an adequate allowance for depreciation
and obsolescence resulting from the introduction of patented in-
ventions, or, in the alternative, making an allowance for the
value of the invention greater than the company had paid there-
for. The Court held that because the installation of the inven-
tions necessitated new outlay of money and abandonment of
property theretofore valuable, these factors must be taken into
account, and, to the end that the issues might be reconsidered
in view of the opinion, the decree below was reversed and the
cases remitted for further disposition.
But the Court, for the purposes of its decision, was obliged to
sustain the master's finding that in the instant case a 75 return
was justified. All that is said in the majority opinion on this
phase of the case is the following: "We think the evidence sup-
ports the finding that a net return of 7 per centum was necessary
in order to avoid confiscation." 50
There is nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court nor in
the opinion of the court below to indicate how this 7% rate was
arrived at, nor to indicate whether it is an over-all rate, or
whether it was arrived at by a consideration of the difference
between money borrowed at certain rates and money invested
by stockholders on a dividend basis. How did the master arrive
at this 7%? What was the testimony upon which it was based?
- 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 (1924), rov'g 273 Fed. 937 (N. D. CaL
1921).
z9 Ibi& 405, 44 Sup. Ct. at 537.
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Is there anything in the record to show that consideration was
given to the methods by which the company secured its funds
and the rates which it paid for its funds? The records in these
rate cases are most voluminous,60 and not accessible to attorneys
throughout the country. Examination of the record in the Pacif-
ic case, however, develops that for the first time in the history
of these cases reaching the United States Supreme Court, the
Court had presented to it the banker's technique for determin-
ing the rate which a public utility must pay in order to induce
investors to invest in its stock. The record is so replete with
valuable information and example of method that it would seem
to justify comprehensive treatment here.6 1
(b) The technique of the proof. The controversy over the
rate to be fixed was as between 8% claimed by the company and
6% claimed by the city.62 The technique of the city was found
by the master to be wholly inadequate.63 Two witnesses were
introduced. One had gone through the mortgage records of the
city and county and gave a table of large mortgage loans, show-
ing rates from 5 to 6%. The other, an accountant, had made a
study of sales prices of securities dealt in on the San Francisco
Exchange, covering the period from 1907 to 1916. From this
he arrived at the average net rate on bonds, 5.09% annually;
municipal bonds sold by the city of San Francisco and on San
Francisco Stock Exchange, 4.59%; and stocks 5.52o.1 His av-
erages, however, were based on some stocks that sold on a yield
basis as high as 14.80% and some as low as 4.58%. This
method was criticised by the experts for the Pacific Company,
who called attention to the fact that not the sales price but the
net return to the company established the cost of the money, 0
6o In Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., the Supreme Court was obliged to
reprimand counsel for a record of 21 volumes, consisting of 20,000 printed
pages, with hundreds of exhibits. The practice of printing this entire record
the court called indefensible and a practice "which we shall hereafter feel
at liberty to punish to the limit of our discretion-possibly by dismissal of
the appeal." Supra note 40, at 174, 42 Sup. Ct. at 266.
-1 See MOSHER, ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC CONTROL
(1929) 24-25:
"It is almost as amateurs against professionals that the legal representa-
tives of the cities go forth to contend for the public's cause. Unless bolstered
by special assistants whose services are expensive, to say the least, the
usual city attorneys are no match for the utility representatives. . . . As
stated by Mr. Bradford: 'Most of the engneers and accountants experienced
in electric lighting, gas, water and other utilities are in the employ of
private companies or expect to be so employed and for that reason they are
unwilling to appear on the public's side.' . . . A third discrepancy between
public and private facilities in presenting cases is in the matter of funds
available for the presentation of evidence. In the conduct of cases in
Pennsylvania it was shown that the utilities have spent four times the
amount expended by the public agencies for the same cases."






and that by bulking the stocks together and obtaining an aver-
age, stocks wholly unlike in character and representing invest-
ment hazards ranging from oil stocks to the stocks of large and
well established banks of national reputation were lumped
together, and that the list submitted included stocks of banks
"generally classed as gilt-edged investments" and representing
"assets so liquid in their nature that the prices of the stocks are
governed largely by the capital, surplus and undivided profits
assignable to each share." ;( In additibn to this testimony, coun-
sel for the city in their brief relied on cases where rates as low
as 6% and even 4% were sustained. ' Neither the master, the
court below, nor the Supreme Court accepted any of these deci-
sions as sustaining a standard rate. The technique of proof and
argument adopted by the city was not successful. Compare this
technique with the technique of the company.
In the first place, it called experts whom the master found to
be "expert witnesses of the highest qualifications." One was
Vice-President and one of the managers of the Wells Fargo
Nevada National Bank, which the master described as "one of
our largest institutions." The other had carried "the tremen-
dous responsibility . . . of obtaining the vast sums of money
that the growth of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company has re-
quired." And the third was a man of wide experience in the
field of investment securities. With the aid of these experts,
the Pacific Company-covered the following ground:
(a) the financial history of the company;
(b) the rates it was obliged to pay in order to secure capital;
(c) the special circumstances connected with raising money
in San Francisco;
(d) the general financial market situation at the time the
ordinance was brought under review, i.e., 1914 to 1916;
(e) an opinion as to the over-all rate necessary in order to
insure the company's ability to raise additional capital.
The finding of the master of 7% it an over-all rate, and in
arriving at his result he adopted the technique of the banking
experts offered by the company. Lipman, one of the three ex-
perts, testified
"... . that any time and place there are a variety of rates
current for loans and investments; that these rates vary mater-
ially, the difference being fundamentally due to differences in
- Ibid. 836.
657 Counsel cited Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, supra note 35, for an estab-
lished rate of 67; Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, supra note 23,
for 6%; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 25, for 65;
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., supra note 39, for 41; Denver v. Denver




risks; risks of loss, risks of delay, risks of uncertainty, and risks
of inconvertibility." 68
He furthermore testified with reference to the general financial
conditions in San Francisco:
"During the panic of 1893 and that of 1907 and also after
war broke out in Europe in 1914, there was a condition of
severe stringency affecting interest rates in all classes ...
State and other gilt edge bonds, now 8.8% to say 4 %, were
difficult of sale at 5% or even 6% and upwards. Loans on mort-
gages were practically unobtainable at any rate and fresh capi-
tal for new enterprises was absolutely unobtainable."
The influence of these conditions lasted much longer, "be-
ing a considerable factor in the investment situation for a pro-
tracted period." The high level was maintained from about
1905 to 1914. "Since the war began business conditions have
been so upset that it is quite impossible to distinguish between
what is normal and what is exceptional." He referred further
to the effect of the San Francisco conflagration, in consequence
of which:
"From 1907 to 1914, capital for permanent investment had
frequently been so scarce in New York and in the other Eastern
markets, that our California corporations have had to bid very
high rates to obtain supplies for use here, instances being known
where the cost was upwards of 10%." 69 •
Hockenbeamer, another of the experts, listed at length the
reasons why there was difficulty in marketing the Pacific Com-
pany's securities70 First he brought out that California is an
earthquake country and that utility properties therefore are li-
able at any time to suffer extensive damage. He also pointed
out that local taxes were exceedingly high in San Francisco,
that there were severe inheritance taxes, and, moreover, that the
stockholders were liable to assessment. 1 He gave the financial
history of the company, from which it appeared that in 1907




7' ibid. 737-739. In 1907 the entire issue of twenty million dollars of the
company's common stock reverted to its treasury through purchase by the
company at public sale, following the failure of the owners to pay an assess-
ment of ten dollars per share, preferred stockholders at the same time
paying an assessment of one million dollars on their stock. In consequence,
it was pointed out that the common stockholders take "the major risks of
the enterprise by guaranteeing both the bonds and preferred stock unless,




The same year it issued $3,883,000 of stock as a bonus at the
rate of 100% of stock to 100% of bonds carrying 6%. In 1908
and 1909, in order to sell 5% bonds, it issued a 100% stock bonus
aggregating $1,063,900, and in 1910 and 1912 it sold for $2,015,-
000 in cash $3,500,000 of its common stock. He attached a
table to his testimony which showed that the average cost of
the company's money for the years 1912 to 1916 inclusive was
on its 5% thirty-year bonds 6.20, on its first preferred 6% cumu-
lative stock 7.40, and on its one year gold notes, 1913 6% and
1914 5%, 9.30.
Lipman testified that a public utility corporation which had
already established its business could not obtain additional
capital on the basis of a return of less than 7%, unless it had
already accumulated a substantial surplus "and unless its earn-
ings are substantially in excess of the amount required for the
payment of interest and dividends upon its outstanding securi-
ties." 11 Weeks, another expert, who was associated with one
of the large investment banking concerns in the country, dealing
both in New York and San Francisco, testified:
"Logic and experience alike indicate conclusively that the rate
of return which a utility must earn on the total investment in
its property, in order to be able to raise the capital necessary to
its operation, must be in excess of the rate on which it can bor-
row a portion, say 60% or 757 of the capital required against
a fixed obligation on the part of the owners or stockholders to
pay interest on the sum so borrowed and to repay the principal
thereof at a definite time, and against the security of a mortgage
covering the property of the corporation." 13
These quotations indicate clearly that the 7% rate fixed by
the master and confirmed by the United States Supreme Court
was an over-all rate, but in arriving at this figure the Court
took account of the rate at which the company could borrow on
its bonds and the rate at which it could raise money on its as-
sessable stock."
72 IM 707.
7 Ibid. 710. Cf. also ibid. 709:
"Experience in the financing of public utility and other similar properties
has shown that the most practical and most economical method of obtaining
the necessary capital has been through borrowing a conservative proportion,
ranging from 507 to 85%, but ordinarily not more than 755, of capital
requirements by the sale of mortgage bonds, the balance of the money re-
quired for the construction or a sitWon of physical property, worbing
capital, and the developing of the business, being obtained by the sale of
stock. In some cases all of the stock sold is in the form of common stock; in
other cases, a portion of the stock is preferred, frequently different classes,
such as 'Pirst Preferred', 'Second Preferred', etc., being authorized and
Sold."
74 Nowhere have we found a better statement of the fundamental differ-
ences between the fixed obligation to pay and the stock investment, espe-




Hockenbeamer presented an example for raising money in
such a public utility as was then under consideration, based on
raising 60% in bonds, 20% in preferred stock and 20% in com-
mon.7 r To obtain $100:
$60 bond money at 6.20% requires $3.72
$20 preferred stock money at 7.40% requires 1.48
$20 common stock money at 8% requires 1.60
6.80
Assuming a margin of safety of 2.25 for common stock, the
total requirement would be 9.05%.
The master adopted this example, saying:
"Mr. Hockenbeamer... has done a service in making explicit
and obvious the fact that rates of cost of money such as those
quoted above are contingent on the existence, not only of a
margin or surplus of capital behind the money loaned or invested,
but of a margin of earnings above the amount necessary for
interest and dividends." "
"Mr. Hockenbeamer also believes that if the company could
earn 8 per cent dividends on its common stock and a margin or
surplus equal to those dividends, it could sell its common stock
at par and obtain its bond money on a 6 per cent basis and its
preferred stock money on a 7 per cent basis. On this theory
he makes an alternative computation, thus:
$60 bond money @ 6 per cent ............. $3.60
$20 preferred stock money @ 7 per cent... 1.40
$20 common stock money @ 8 per cent .... 1.60
Margin of safety for common stock ......... 1.60
Total ................................ 8.20" '
"There is a fundamental difference between the loan of money against an
obligation to repay it in full secured by collateral, which obligation is held
by a bondholder or a noteholder, and the position of a stockholder, the
owner of a property, charged with all the duties and obligations involved
in ownership, including the control and management of the property, the
return to bondholders or noteholders of money borrowed from them, with
interest thereon, and the performance of all the other obligations of an
owner." Ibid. 712.
7SIbid. 783-784.
76Ibid. 1208. Cf. also:
"We must disabuse our minds at the outset of the notion that the face
rate on government or other bonds, on preferred stocks or on secured
notes has any but a remote bearing on the subject. We must also bear in
mind the greater risks of any business enterprise; the fact that the cost
of money embodied in the sale of securities is eater than the face rate
paid the investor by the amount of discount and other expense incident to
marketing the securities, and paying trustees, coupon-paying banks and
others during their life; and, finally, that the securing of money at a given
cost, if favorable, implies a margin of earnings above that cost. The
reasonable rate is sometimes defined as that rate of earning which will
attract necessary capital to the enterprise; sometimes as that which is
customarily earned in business of equivalent risk. I emphasize the point




Here we have complete and perfect proof that if we pay 6%
on 60% of the money required as first lien bond money and 7%
per annum on 20% of the total required in preferred stock, the
company does not need an over-all rate of more than 8.20%
in order to sell its common on a basis of 8% per annum, allow-
ing a margin of safety per annum of 1.60o. But suppose it
should appear that not 60% but 75% is obtainable and that it is
obtainable at 5 %, that 20% additional is obtainable at not
more than 6 % and that but 5% of the total capital required -
is obliged to pay the 8% rate, the figures would then bp:
$75 bond money at 5%% .................... $4.125
$20 preferred stock money at 6 % ........... 1.30
$5 common stock money at 8%............... .40
Margin of safety .......................... .40
6.225
It seems clear that to determine the fair rate the court must
consider:
(a) the company's borrowing capacity;
(b) the rate of interest it must pay on its bonds;
(c) the amount it can raise on bonds;
(d) the preferred stock; what dividend rate?
(e) the security of the company behind the dividends in
way of surplus, other earnings, etc.
It follows that the trier of the facts must analyze the company's
financial set-up, iis actual experience in raising money, and the
actual returns to investors required to get new capital.
It must be recalled that the Pacific company did not confine
its operations to San Francisco, nor to manufacturing and
purveying gas, though it was the only purveyor of gas in San
Francisco. A large part of its business lay elsewhere, through
some thirty different counties in California. It owned gas
works in a number of cities and great hydro-electric and steam
plants, generating electricity for light and power, serving many
towns and rural communities. It owned a street railway in
Sacramento and a water system in the foothills of the Sierras.
The Pacific company, therefore, in its relationships to the busi-
ness of gas purveying in San Francisco, was a holding company.
There appeared to be no other way by which the master could be
furnished with evidence from which he could find the over-
all rate required by the company to induce capital to invest
in the enterprise than by considering the whole of its financing.
The logic of the situation would seem to require that the same
technique be applied when the trier of the facts is to fix a rate
of return which shall not be confiscatory, where the property
in use is part and parcel of a holding company system.
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It will be observed that the master did not allow 9.05% or
8.20%; he allowed only 7%, and he was sustained by the Supreme
Court. He eliminated the margin urged by the company's ex-
perts, computing the cost of money at 6.60% or 6.80% and thus
allowed a margin of .20% or .40% as the case may be. He
based this primarily upon the fact that 7% was testified to by
two of the banking expert witnesses as a minimum fair rate
of earning and that the higher cost to the company of its
money during the years 1913 to 1916 was not a necessary cri-
terion.
(c) Applying the technique of proof to the new financial
situation. The portrait of the investor of 1914-16 in San Fran-
cisco public utilities as painted by the financial experts in the
Pacific case bears as little resemblance to the general investor
of 1929 as Holbein's drawing of Henry VIII bears to our own
portrait of Henry Ford.78 The modern investor to whom appeal
is made is the common "man in the street." Knowledge of
securities, the earning power of utilities as compared with in-
dustrials, the difference in yield. on gilt-edged bonds, as com-
pared with dividends on common or preferred, is broad and gen-
eral. The growing withdrawal of savings banks deposits shows
the trend of the day. Investment houses have by a long series of
intelligent education created this general market for securities.
They have used and are still using the radio. They distribute
carefully prepared pamphlets as well as analytical studies of
earnings, present and prospective. Books on profits in long
holdings of bank and insurance stocks are written. We are a
nation of investors today, common stock owners as well as bond-
holders. There is competition for our dollar.79
A reputable daily can report that municipal bond houses ex-
pect to attract long range investors toward municipal bonds by
analyses showing that common stocks normally considered "safe
and suitable investments for surplus funds are yielding less in
dividends than the highest grade bonds." 80 On July 19, 1929,
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe common, paying i0% per annum,
sold for 257 7/8. Canadian Pacific paying 10% sold for 245.
(Its high in 1929 was 265 7/8) New York Central, paying 8%,
sold for 240. Investors buying bank and insurance stocks for
long time investment buy not on the basis of the annual yield,
which sometimes is as low as 3%, but buy in expectation of later
distribution of increased surplus in stock subscription rights,
78 See HACKETT, HENRY THE EIGHTH (1928) 417, 429-30.
79 The debacle in the stock market since this article was written does not
change these conclusions. "Odd-lot" buyers rushed to the market for
"bargain counter" investments, and got them.
80 New York Herald Tribune, July 15, 1929, at 1.
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split-up of stock, stock dividends, etc. The average yield of in-
dustrial shares around July 1, 1929, was 4.91%.8
The Court must take notice of the fact that probably for the
first time in the history of this country there is a widespread
investment movement in the direction of long term investments
in stock wherein the investor looks forward to capital increment
rather than to annual dividend return.
As this section of the article is being written there comes
striking confirmation of the need for a complete recasting of
the financial picture which- the United States Supreme Court
has 'had presented to it in rate cases during the last decade.
The Middle West Utilities Company announces a complete re-
organization of its financial structure, involving the complete
retirement of its 8% prior lien and its 8% preferred stocks, in
lieu of which it proposes to issue common stock rights to all
classes of stockholders. The new preferred which it will issue
will carry a 6% dividend, payable in cash or in common stock,
at the option of the holder. The common stock will pay divi-
dends not in cash but in the form of common stock, at the annual
rate of 8% of the number of shares held. For example, the
holder of 100 shares of common will receive as dividend thereon
two shares quarterly, or eight shares annually.82 The president
of the company announces that the plan is backed by
the striking economic growth throughout the entire ter-
ritories served by the Middle West Utilities system, which places
upon the company the responsibility of continuously increasing
the facilities for service. To do this it is necessary to have a
financial structure capable, under present-day investment con-
ditions, of maintaining a continuous flow of invested capital."
By one stroke the company will cut out the 8% annual pay-
ments required on its prior lien and 8% preferred stocks, which
81 Ibid. July 14, 1929, at Section XIII. It was 4.7% the first of the year,
according to a compilation by the Standard Statistics Company, of New
York, it appearing that dividend rates had increased at a relatively faster
pace than stock prices. The table showed that the highest yield was 7.3%
(cotton goods) *hile the lowest was 1.7% (aircraft).
See also chart showing "The Long Term Trend of Security Yields" (New
York Herald Tribune, July 28, 1929, Section XIII) published by the Standard
Statistics Company, showing that 50 irdustrials have steadily gone down
to a yield of between 3 and 4%, but 33 industrial common stocks have
steadily gone down from a peak in 1917 of between 8 and 9% and a peak in
1920-21 of 87 to very close to 4% at the end of 1928, and that 20 high
grade preferred stocks have gradually gone down to a yield of 5%.
82 To bring this about, the company will offer to its present stocdholders
common stock rights on the basis of one new share at $200 for each four
shares of all classes now held. At this rate, as the stock is now selling
around 355, on a.10 for 1 basis, it is estimated that nearly 67 million dol-
lars in rights to stockholders is thus being distributed. New York Herald
Tribune, Aug. 4, 1929, Section XIII, at 1.
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are to be called for redemption. As this is a holding company,
it is quite obvious that the first lien securities on the utility
companies which the holding company controls will not even
have to pay 6% per annum. In the light of this new develop-
ment, this modern type of finance, resulting from a new attitude
of mind on the part of the common stock investor who looks now
to the future by way of securing new shares in capital owner-
ship, rather than to the immediate present by way of annual
yields, must there not be a complete revision of such percentage
figures as the Supreme Court has had before it in determining
the over-all rate?
Investors now understand that earnings of public utility com-
panies are not confined to the utility properties used in the public
service. A recent article points out that "other income" in the
case of five railroads was equivalent to nearly 50% of the net
earnings from railway operations and that one railroad alone
in a short time will be taking in enough interest and dividends
from its investment securities to cover fully the current $10
dividend on its common stock. 3 Publication of American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. earnings for the first half year of 1929
showed operating revenues of $48,495,536, and "Dividends and
Interest" aggregating $63,983,615. When this appeared, it
quickly reflected itself in a rise of the market of the common
stock. The oil properties of Atchison and the nickel mines of
Canadian Pacific contribute alike to the common stockholder'o
confidence in his investment. He expects some time to realize on
the capital assets.
The special master in the Pacific case said, "It may be true
now that electricity has a surer market and a more certain basis
of production than gas." 84 He was prophetic. The Pacific
Company would hardly recognize herself today in her portraits
of fifteen years ago. Her net income has doubled in the last
seven years. The reductions in electric rates alone have ag-
gregated an amount equivalent to twice the annual dividend
requirements on the outstanding common stock. The com-
pany has now (as contrasted with 1918) total reserves of around
$26,000,000 and a profit and loss surplus of fifteen and a half
millions. Its capital is now over $207,000,000. Early last year
it sold an issue of $20,000,000 first and refunding mortgage
41/27% series E bonds on a basis costing the company "but 48/
per cent, the lowest in its history." These bonds are followed
by two issues of preferred stock, about $79,000,000 in first pre-
ferred, carrying cumulative dividends at the rate of 6%, and
about $4,100,000, also first preferred, with cumulative dividends
at the rate of 5 %. "The present rate of $2 a share annually"
83 Standard Statistics, July 5, 1929.
"Record, supra note 62, at 1210.
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on its common stock "is equivalent to $8 a share on the old
stock, which was receiving payments on that basis prior to its
exchange for the shares now outstanding." Here is a picture so
different from the one presented in the case which went to the
Supreme Court that it is not conceivable that on such a record
a 7% over-all rate could be sustained.
The Court has but recently admonished the bar in the Sin-
clair 5 case that, in reading its opinions, "Always the language
used in an opinion must be read in the light of the issues pre-
sented." New factors of immense financial importance, not yet
presented to the Court, will call for new applications of its prin-
ciples.
Yet the exceptionally competent financial experts in the Pacific
case gave us, as we have seen, a reasonable technique of proof
by which to determine what constitutes a "fair and reasonable
return" on "business dedicated to a public service." While the
Court may take judicial notice of changed economic conditions
generally (as it has done on other occasions)so, evidence should
now be presented bearing upon such important factors as the
market conditions of the time and the cost of money to the
utility, etc. Even to establish an over-all rate of 754, it was
necessary in the Pacific ease to show a set of circumstances in-
dicating great local difficulties in financing, as well as general
war-time and after war-time conditions, earthquake hazard, as-
sessment liability on the common, etc.,-all intended to establish
an over-all rate of but 7%.
Let us, then, by way of example, apply the technique of the
Pacific case, changing only the facts to reflect more accurately
present day finance. To raise $100, it will cost per annum, we
will say,
$75 1st lien bonds at 5/2% .................. $4.125
$10 preferred at 6% ........................ .60
$15 common split up by means of the holding
company device into:
$10 1st debentures at 6% .................... .60
$22 Ist preferred at 7% ................... .175
$2 common at 8% ........................ .20
$5.70
If we double the return on the common, as Pacific's expert did,
we add $.20, making $5.90, or less than 6% over-all rate on the
whole. Now, if, instead of a 6% over-all rate, the utility is
allowed 8%, it will receive on the whole amount of $100, $8.00.
ar See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749, 767, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 477
(1929).
er Cf. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 25, with Newton v.
Consolidated Gas Co., spra note 40.
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It will pay out to all except the common stockholders of the
holding company $5.50, leaving $2.50 to pay on a $2.50 invest-
ment, or 100% per annum to common stockholders on their in-
vestment."
To enable the rate-regulatory body to determine what "should
be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise money
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties," 13 the
company's financial structure must be examined. In the very
nature of the case it would seem that there must be considered
not only its financial history, its stability and earning power,
surpluses and reserves, but also the rate at which it has borrowed
money, the amount it can raise on -its bonds, on its preferred
stock, and on its common stock, and the general practice at the
time the rate is fixed for raising such funds. Moreover, there
must be regard for two other factors: first, the ratio of the
amount which it can pay at low interest rates on borrowings
as compared with the dividends it must offer investors in its
common stock; and finally, the' amount over and above such a
reasonable dividend rate as will insure safety to bondholders and
a reasonable assurance to preferred and common stockholders
that their dividends will be paid. The new technique will re-
quire the fact-finding body to go through the processes which
investment bankers go through in determining marketability of
securities. Hence the financial set-up of the company, the re-
lationship of its earnings to other assets, its common stock value
as represented by a holding company split-up-all must be ana-
lyzed and considered.
If this be done, it would seem then that the large returns to
a comparatively small group of controlling stockholders in hold-
ing companies must come down. It is inconceivable that, when
it is properly before it, the Supreme Court will not apply to the
new factual situation its own past rulings, i. e., the distinction
between ordinary business and industries "affected with a public
87That these figures are not exaggerations but are in line with actual
conditions is shown by news from the Chicago Stock Exchange (coming, as
it happens, as this part of this article is being written: New York Times,
July 20, 1929), from which it appears that from June 30 to July 19, 1929,
the common stock of one utility holding company rose from 15 to 94, an
appreciation of $79 a share, or a total of $63,000,000; but it is stated that
those who own the common did still better and their profit is estimated to
be at around 94 millions. This result had been achieved on a marketing of
debentures and prior preferred, the debentures carrying but 57, but ac-
companied with an option to buy 50 shares of common with each $1000
bond at $15 per share. The preferred rate is not given but it was accom-
panied with a right to subscribe for five shares of common at $15 for each
share of preferred.
88 Bluefield case, supra note 21, at 692, 43 Sup. Ct. at 679.
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interest," as well as its rules for determining rates properly
chargeable to consumers. In the recent Dayton-Goose Creek case
it said concerning the right of stockholders in a business dedi-
cated to a public service:
"By investment in a business dedicated to the public service
the owner must recognize that, as compared with investment
in private business, he can not expect either high or speculative
dividends, but that his obligation limits him to only fair or
reasonable profit." I'
It will not deter the enterprising pioneer by depriving him of
the large returns in increased stock dividends (as it did not in
the McCardle case) but on the other hand it will not, it would
seem, continue to guarantee to the stockholder of a holding com-
pany a rate of return which, on analysis, is shown to net him,
after the enterprise is on its feet, 100% or more per annum.
Whether the over-all rate in any given case shall be 6%, 7%, 8%
or more will depend upon the financial conditions prevailing at
the time of the inquiry. But we are reminded again that even
upon such a record as was presented in the Pacific case, con-
cededly one indicating bad marketing conditions for the com-
pany's bonds, its preferred and its common stock, the utility's
effort to secure an 8% over-all rate failed and the master's find-
ing of 7% was sustained.
It will be no answer to say that because rate-regulating
bodies have no jurisdiction over holding companies they are not
concerned with the stock or debentures of such companies. In
determining values for the rate base, the court may consider,
but is not bound by, the amount of the company's outstanding
stocks and bords. But this relates to only one phase of the
inquiry, namely, the determination of the value of the property
"used or to be used in the service devoted to the public," while,
on the other hand, "whether a rate yields such a return as not
to be confiscatory depends upon circumstances, locality, and
risk." 90 Hence, in order to determine the credit borrowing
capacity of the utility, the regulating body (or the court on
review) must inquire into all the details of the financial struc-
ture of the company. For the same reasons, whether it can regu-
late holding companies or not, it must examine the reality
of the situation. 1 It cannot be fooled by stopping the door of
inquiry at the rate of dividend paid on the common stock, which
89 Dayton-Goose Creek R. R. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 481, 44
Sup. Ct. 169, 173 (1924).
so See the Bluefield case, supra note 21, at 693, 43 Sup. Ct. at 679.
91 The Supreme Court has not looked with favor upon devices designed
to aid a corporation by reducing its net earnings co as to establish a rate
as confiscatory. See Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345,
12 Sup. Ct. 400, 402 (1892).
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in turn is held by a holding company. Since it is not the divi-
dend which is paid, but the rate of dividend necessary to enable
the utility to get the money that is to be determined by the fact-
finding body, it must inquire into the complete factual situation.
Nor will the courts be dissuaded from this task by the fears
prevailing in 1916-17 and the years immediately following.
Speculative returns may still be justified in new pioneering
enterprises. But it cannot be argued that highly speculative
profits are now needed for our seasoned public utilities such as
power and light. The reasoning which kept the Pacific Com-
pany down to a 7% over-all rate should keep the over-all rate
down in enterprises still better situated.
Neither will the Supreme Court be dissuaded by fear of the
effect on general economic and social conditions of lower rates.
Too much is available in the way of material already published
by governmental agencies indicating the fact that low utility
rates, especially of light and power, mean improved industrial
and social conditions. The clamor is for "cheap power" to
compete with other markets. This demand will increase when
the competition of foreign industries with cheap governmentally
developed power will force itself upon our attention.2
Mr. Justice Peckham said in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.:
"The elevated railroads in New York when first built charged
10 cents for each passenger, but when the rate was reduced to
5 cents it is common knowledge that their receipts were not cut
in two but that from increased patronage the earnings increased
from year to year, and soon surpassed the highest sum ever
received upon the 10-cent rate." 93
It was this reasoning which led him also to say:
"And again, increased consumption at the lower rate might
result in increased earnings, as the cost of furnishing the gas
would not increase in proportion to the increased amount of
gas furnished." 94
The newly elected president of the National Electric Light As-
sociation, Matthew S. Sloan, says (1929) that it is
"... more than a coincidence that in every case I know of
a reduction in domestic electric rates has been followed by in-
creased use of service. There may be instances where this was
not true, but they have not come to my attention. It was true
in Brooklyn under conditions which covered a series of reduc-
tions over a period of several years. It has been true in up-state
New York, in New England, in the Middle West, and on the
92 Consider also such projects as governmentally developed hydroelectric
power at Boulder Dam, Muscle Shoals, and on the St. Lawrence River.




Pacific Coast. These companies which show the highest annual
domestic sales also'show the lowest rates. We have, therefore,
in the experience of our industry, what may be accepted as a
guiding principle in stimulation of sales of service for domestic
use. The way to increase such sales is to wisely and properly
lower the domestic rates." 05
It was Mr. Ford who blazed the way for the newer economic
policy of widening the field of consumers by selling at a low
margin of profit. So we have seen, leaders in the public utility
field are now advocating strongly the reduction of rates to widen
the use of electricity, gas, telephone, etc. It thus appears that
lower rates may indeed result in larger earnings for the stock-
holders.
. (d) New capital increment through valuaticrn of patents.
One other point comes within the scope of this article, interre-
ated with our consideration of the Pacific case. It will be re-
rlled that the, master fixed, as the value of the patents, the sum
,f $46,066.68 and said he took this figure because it was the best
tgure offered to him in the way of proof. It was the sum ap-
i earing upon the books of the company as paid to the inventor
ior the patents. Regarding the plant thus replaced, the master
.ssumed that this had already been covered by write-offs for
depreciation. It was the duty of a prudent company, he said, to
set up annual reserves for such obsolescences. This Spartan
viewpoint the majority of the Supreme Court refused to accept.
It said that one of two things should have been done. Either
the master should have made an adequate allowance for part
of a plant rendered obsolete by the introduction of the patents,
or he should have ascertained the value of the patent and treated
it as one of the capital assets forming part of the rate base.
The Pacific Company's experts urged that the value of this
patent was $4,203,300, or a little less than one hundred times
what the company had paid for it. They arrived at this valua-
tion, as appears from the record, by a process such as is used
in patent litigation, by capitalizing the earning value of the
patent over the life of the patent. If a patent will earn, say, a
thousand dollars a year, these experts argue it is worth that
sum which will produce a thousand dollars a year for the legal
or estimated life of the patent. Now the Supreme Court did not
,lay this method must be followed. But as we have seen, it
could not reverse the court below, as the minority pointed out,
unless it believed the real value of the patents to be a very sub-
stantial sum, more than enough to wipe out the margin of safety
-ti1l left in the figures of earnings on a 7% basis 0  The Court
95 New York Evening Post, July 29, 1929.
6The master found, and the court below adopted, as the reasonable value
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gave no clue as to what method it believed should be followed
in estimating the value of the patents, but sooner or later it
wiil be obliged to pass upon this question. Then it will have
to meet this query: Since the earning value of an untested
patent or one tested for but a brief period is a mere prophecy by
experts, are consumers of a public utility to guarantee the ful-
fillment of the experts' prophecies? In short, if the experts say
the patents are worth a capital sum which will produce annually
the amount which, in their opinion, they say it will earn, is the
rate base to include this item and thus put upon the consumers
the burden of paying an amount which is necessary to insure
to the utility the fulfillment of the experts' prophecy? How
much of the Pacific Company's enhanced success in the invest-
ment world was due to the Court's decision on this point of
patent values, we are, of course, unable to say, but nothing
could be more certain to add to the readiness with which inves-
tors will absorb utility common stocks or utility holding com-
panies' common, on the basis of prospective additional increases
in capital, than the assurance that every new savings device in-
troduced will be certain of realizing the prophecies of the experts
in the way of increased profits. It would seem, therefore, if we
are to recognize the rule that stockholders who have engaged in a
public service are limited to a fair or reasonable profit, that the
rates necessary to secure new capital must be reduced. In
other words, it can hardly be expected that the Supreme Court
will sustain a method of rate making by which common stock-
holders secure both capital gains and the high annual rate re-
turns. Such a method savors too much of stuffing the goose
of the properties used and useful and reasonably necessary to the manu-
facture and distribution of gas in the area under consideration for the
year 1913 to 1914, including working capital, the sum of $13,976,435. Tak-
ing 7%7, or $978,350.45, as a reasonable return on the capital investment
made a total of $3,384,129.56. The total revenue at the ordinance rate was
$3,405,532.51, or $21,402.95 in excess of the 7% return on the capital in-
vestment.
Taking the 7% figure on $4,203,300, if 7% is the rate allowed, the com-
pany would be required to earn $294,231, which would not be covered by
the figures referred to. The minority, Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., were of
opinion that the question was not one of continuing importance to the
parties, since its correctness depended upon the state of the particular rec-
ord and that any defect in the record could be avoided in proceedings con-
cerning the rates for any year after June 30, 1916. "Only a large under-
valuation would affect the result, as the master and the court found that
during the year 1914-1915 the prescribed rate would yield $89,446 in
excess of a 7% return on the rate base, and for 1915-1916, an excess of
$171,464." (See footnotes 6 and 7, 265 U. S. 403, 421, 44 Sup. Ct. 537, 543.)
But it is apparent from a reading of the majority opinion that the Court
was quite ready to believe that "a large undervaluation" did affect the
result, and based upon this belief it held the ordinance unconstitutional and
remitted the cases for further disposition.
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with a continuous filling of golden eggs to make sure of the
continued production of golden eggs.
We can do no better in closing this article than to turn to the
guiding principle laid down by Harlan, J., in the Coaington
Tnmpike case as far back as 1896:
"It cannot be said that a corporation operating a public high-
way [utility] is entitled, as of right, and without reference to
the interest of the public, to realize a given per cent upon its
capital stock. When the question arises whether the legislature
has exceeded its constitutional power in prescribing rates to be
charged by a corporation controlling a public highway, stock-
holders are not the only persons whose rights or interests are
to be considered. The rights of the public are not to be
ignored .... In short, each case must depend upon its special
facts; and when a court, without assuming itself to prescribe
rates, is required to determine whether the rates prescribed by
the legislature for a corporation controlling a public highway
[utility] are, as an entirety, so unjust as to destroy the value of
its property for all the purposes for which it was acquired, its
duty is to take into consideration the interests both of the public
and of the owner of the property, together with all other circum-
stances that are fairly to be considered in determining whether
the legislature has, under the guise of regulating rates, exceeded
its constitutional authority, and practically deprived the owner
of property without due process of law. What thoge other cir-
cumstances may be, it is not necessary now to decide. That
can be best done after the parties have made their proofs." 0t
97 Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 596, 597,
1T Sup. Ct. 198, 205 (1896).
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APPENDIX
Besides the Supreme Court cases discussed in this article a number of
other cases have been cited for an "8% customary and required rate,"
notably by eminent counsel in the McCardle case. We subjoin an analysis
of these cases, showing that none of them sustains any such rate, but the
utterances of the courts are, as usual, to be read in the light of the facts
presented. Not one of them considers the rate as an "over-all" rate as was
done in the Pacific case, supra.
Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429, 118
Pac. 354 (1911). The full extent of this case is disclosed in the syllabus
prepared by the court itself:
"Rates charged by a telephone company for services of a telephone ex-
change that yields only sufficient revenue to pay operating expenses and
fixed charges, including a reasonable amount for depreciation, and a return
of approximately 5.5% per annum (less than the legal rate of interest)
on the value of the properties used in rendering the service, held not ex-
cessive, oppressive, or unreasonable to the public."
The figures in the case are very simple. Net earnings for 1908, after de-
ducting all expenditures, were $6,151.84, which made but 5.5% on the sum
of $113,596.42 which the court found to be the present value of the plant. In
this case the court was influenced by the fact that 6% was the legal rate of
interest. There was no consideration of the financial set-up of the com-
pany and no separate consideration of the varying rates to be paid for
bond money or preferred or common stock.
McAlester Gas & Coke Co. v. Corporation Comm., 102 Okla. 118, 227 Pac.
83 (1924). The entire case dealt with the application of rules for deter-
mining the rate base. The rate of return was not discussed. The court
said, in passing:
"The testimony in this cause, as produced by the appellants upon the
questions of depreciation and amortization, authorizes an allowance of 17%
upon the net value for these purposes, also 8% on such valuation for return
to the owners. There was no testimony to the contrary." Ibid. 123, 227
Pac. at 87.
Alton Water Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 279 Fed. 869 (S. D. Ill.
1922). Examination of the case discloses that the rates proposed would
yield only from one-half of 1% to 1'A% on the present value of the utility's
property. It was held that this was confiscatory. The court said:
"It has been held that no rate of return can be deemed reasonable which
is not high enough to attract capital to the form of investment involved in
utility properties, such as complainant's. A return of 8 per cent upon
the fair value has been held to be reasonable." Ibid. 873.
But, as we have shown, 6% has also been held to be reasonable, and so
has 4%.
Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 300 Fed. 190 (D.
Ind. 1924). Here the court gave the rule clearly:
"Leaving out of consideration the question of what may be in any given
case a fair return for the user to pay for a service, the fair return, gener-
ally speaking, is such an amount as would at the time of the inquiry induce
the investment of money in such a utility. Money will not be invested in
utilities unless the probable return will be at least equal to the return on
CONFISCATORY RATES
securities of like kind and character; otherwise many communities would
be left without necessary utilities until they could be established under
public ownership. One method of arriving at these conditions that would
induce investment in public utilities is by testimony showing the rate that
securities of like kind and character command in the mar -et." Ibid. 201.
The figures in the case showed, from the comparative statements made by
the court, that a 6% return would require $2,039,653.36 annually, while net
earnings on the basis of the Commission's order would produce but $1,607,-
162.07. The Commission's order was found to be not sustainable, even on a
6% rate, after the court had made its modifications in the rate base.
Michigan Public Utilities Com(. v. Michigan State Telephone Co., 228
Mich. 658, 200 N. W. 749 (1924). There was no consiaeration given to the
rate of return, because, as appears from the opinion, the complaint of the
rate of return fixed by the Commission at 75 "is not pressed and will 1a
passed."
In Consolidated Gas Co. v. Prendergast, 6 F. (2d) 243 (S. D. N. Y. 1925),
a detailed table showing comparison of returns for 1922, 1923 and 1924 in-
dicated what would be required on either a 61, 7% or 8% return, computed
on. either investment cost figures, reproduction or so-called present cost
values, from which figures the special master concluded:
"From the preceding figures it will be seen that in neither year and
under neither the past nor present prices would the ompany have earned
a return of even as much as 6 per cent. on its investment or reproduction
cost or present value." Ibid. 273.
The figures showed a reproduction cost for 1922 of $159,710,750.73. A G&
return would be $9,582,645.04. The actual return in 1922, on the basis of gas
furnished, was $2,346,357.18. For the year ending Dec. 31, 1923, the
return was $4,072,181.08. The master, however, said:
"I find that 8 per cent. is a rate customarily required in the locality to
be earned on the present value of the property of a regulated public utility,
and that the plaintiff should be permitted to earn at least this amount."
Ibid. 274.
Since the company had not earned even 6%, obviously there was no
necessity for going into any 8% rate. Winslow, J., affirmed the master's
finding as to the facts and went on to say:
"The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient
and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable
it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties." Ibid. 280.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 294 Fed. 102 (W.
D. Ark. 1923), aff'd, 270 U. S. 627, 46 Sup. Ct. 206 (1926). The main
point determined in this case is whether or not going value is a proper
element to be considered in making rates for telephone service. The Dis-
trict Court held that it was. All that is said with regard to the rate of
return is as follows:
"By allowing a valuation of $685,605, which includes a going value of 10
per cent., and by reducing the annual depreciation to 4 per cent., the city
shows a return of 6.29 per cent. Its engineer admits that a fair return
would be 8 per cent." Ibid. 108.
The preliminary injunction to restrain putting into effect the ordinance
rates was made permanent. There was no discussion as to whether the 8%
was to be an over-all rate and it is quite clear that there was no evidence
taken upon this point, since the city's own engineer was prepared to admit
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that a fair return would be 8%. Analysis of the record might easily sus-
tain the engineer's opinion on the history of this particular company.
Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 211 App. Div.
272, 207 N. Y. Supp. 284 (3d Dep't 1925). The order in the case was
annulled and the case sent back to the Public Service Commission for
further determination. On the rate phase of the case the court said:
"Commissioner Semple has demonstrated in his opinion that a one dollar
and seventy-five cent rate will produce an eight per cent return on the
rate base of three hundred and seventy thousand dollars. We are given to
understand that the one dollar and seventy cent rate allowed by the major-
ity will, on that basis, produce not to exceed seven and one-tenth per cent
return. Even assuming the rate base adopted as fair and that the one
dollar and seventy cent rate will yield to the company the amount for
annual depreciation reserve allowed in Commissioner Semple's opinion and
seven and one-tenth per cent return on that rate base, we think such rate
of return under the circumstances of this case may well be considered
inadequate, in view of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Bluefield Waterworks & Improv. Co. v. Public Service Comm. (supra).
In that case the United States Supreme Court referred to the fact that
the company had received a rate of return that was very low through tr
long period up to the time of the inquiry by the Commission and that such
fact should be taken into consideration and a higher rate allowed in order
to be fair." Ibid. 275.
New York & Queens Gas Co. v. Prendergast, 1 F. (2d) 351 (S. D. N. Y.
1924). All that the special master said under the heading "Rate of Return"
was:
"The plaintiff presented evidence by testimony of witnesses as to the
rate of return which a public utility company such as the plaintiff should
earn on the amount required to build or buy its property. They placed this
at 10 per cent. The courts have found, at different times and under varying
conditions, rates of return ranging generally from 6 to 8 per cent. [Citing
cases already considered]. I believe, under the evidence and the decisions,
the plaintiff might properly claim a return of 8 per cent. on the present
value of its property used and useful for the benefit of the public. On no
possible basis could it be found that it could earn, in view of my previous
holdings, anything approximating this amount. But the question is not
decisive in this case whether any given rate of return is or is not confisca-
tory, in view of my findings as to the results of operation." Ibid. 370.
The court said:
"In the instant case the overwhelming proof is to the effect that the statu-
tory rate would not even cover operating charges, let alone the question of
sufficient revenue to approximate a reasonable return on its investment
whether that investment be considered either upon the theory of original
cost or present value conditions." Ibid. 374.
People's Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm., 214 App. Div. 108,
211 N. Y. Supp. 662 (3d Dep't 1925), is devoted entirely to the considera-
tion of the error of the Public Service Commission in failing to consider
reproduction value ind going value. No consideration was given to the
percentage of return that should be earned.
Kings County Lighting Co. v. Prendergast, 7 F. (2d) 192 (E. D. N. Y.
1925). While the 8% rate is mentioned in the syllabus as "a reasonable rate
of return for a gas company," the master found a rate base of $11,200,666,
upon which the returns estimated would provide only 2.94%. There was
testimony in the case by a witness that at least 8% was required "in order
to maintain and support its [the company's] credit and to enable it to se-
cure new capital in competition with the requirements for capital." The
Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the fact that the master had sug-
gested as a reasonable rate of return not less than 8%:
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"But the master's report deals with present fair values. Of course, if,
when the new rate is fixed, values have changed, the Public Service Com-
mission may make such new rate based upon evidence, and will be wholly
unhampered by the findings or recommendations of the master." Ibid. 218.
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Prende-rgast, 7 F. (2d) 628 (E. D. N. Y.
1925). In this case, resolving every doubt against the plaintiff, the court
found that it was doubtful "whether in any view of the -ituation the yield
would be sufficient to meet the recurring payments of interest upon out-
standing bonds." The plaintiff introduced expert evidence which showed
that a rate of 87 was a normal rate "in view of all the contingencies sur-
rounding a business of this character." The court said:
"This seems in accord with prevailing conditions of which the court will
take judicial notice, and Seens also to he in harmony with current adjudi-
cations." Ibid. 654.
The defendants did not offer any evidence upon this phase of the matter.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 5 F. (2d) 77 (E.
D. S. C. 1925). The special master found that the legislative rates which
were enjoined yielded, on investment cost of $6,025,090.70, not more than
2A7%. No evidence was offered in the case by either party regarding the
capitalization or bond issues of the company. The court did not adopt the
8% ruling of the master. It contented itself with finding that the rates
were dearly confiscatory, saying:
"Indeed, the present value of the property as ascertained by the master
and found by this court might be largely reduced and still those rates,
based upon such reduced value, would not provide anythin li.e a proper
remuneration under the Constitution.. . . The prescribe rates, in any
possible view that could be taken of the value of the property, are unreason-
able and confiscatory.' Ibiz. 98.
In Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations, 269 Fed. 433 (D. Kau. 1920),
the court found a valuation of $2,500,000. For the year ending Dec. 31,
1920, the company showed net earnings on the 80 cent gas rate approved
by the Commission to be $34,794. The court said that an 85 return would
require $200,000 a.year, a 6% return would require $150,000 a year and a
4% return would be $100,000 a year, which was more than the company
could earn on the 80 cent rate as found by the court.
In Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208 (D. Ala. 1923), it ap-
peared that the dividends declared by the company during the entire 17
years of its operations aggregated only about $S0,000 and no dividends had
been declared since December 31, 1917. From the order of the Commission
itself it appeared that at the low rate then fixed, the company was not able
even to meet its actual operating expenses. The net income for 1922, upon
a basis of the rate enjoined, would have amounted to $91,963.93, or 4.59%
on a two million dollar investment. Setting up a depreciation and reserve
of 2.5% on $2,000,000, or $50,000, its net earnings would be reduced to
$41.963, which the court says "is 2.09 per cent. upon a valuation of $2,000,-
000 and a less per cent. when going concern value is added." Clayton, 
.,
did say, however (though unnecessary to his decision):
"I find that the plaintiff is entitled to earn 8 per cent. per annum upon
the value of its used and useful property. This is the legal rate of interest
in Alabama and in the absence of contract is presumed to be reasonable
in the ordinary dealings between men, and by analogy should be adopted
here if there was no evidence to the contrary; but, however that may 
be,





New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, 300 Fed. 822 (S. D. N. Y.
1924). Here error was committed in the failure of the commission to in-
clude in the rate base going value. The court found that it had erred in
the determination of the rate base, but in the course of its remarks it said:
"Admittedly it is and has been customary to allow as a reasonable rate of
return for regulated businesses like this one, 8 per cent. The justification
for the custom is the habit of business men, and a departure therefrom is
not right because a court or commission prefers a lower rate. Reasons are
wanted, and none are set forth in this record. Under such circumstances
there is no presumption of correctness attaching to the 7 per cent. limit.
The question always raised in rate cases is this: What rate of return, with
due regard to certainty and security, will attract the intelligent investor?
It remains to be seen whether a departure from the present customary rate
is warranted by modern conditions." Ibid. 826.
There is hardly anything in this utterance, though it comes from very re-
spectable sources, upon whih the court is bound irrevocably to an 8%
over-all standard. The decision was rendered in 1924. Since that time the
Pacific case has been decided. The technique for presenting evidence in the
Pacific case was not resorted to in the Telephone Company case. "Reasons
are wanted, and none are set forth in this record," said the court.
City of Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed, 818 (D. Minn. 1923). Here the
master fixed a gas rate based upon an assumed rate of return of 7%% on
the value of the property. This was challenged by the city as excessive.
The court said:
"It is said that the company'g bonds draw less interest, and therefore
the stockholders will obtain more than 7% per cent. in dividends upon their
stock. It is obvious that this argument would not be of force, if the com-
pany were free from debt. It may be that the bonds of the company were
sold at a discount; but, if the company had the good fortune to rell its
bonds at less than this rate of interest, that fact should not diminish the
rate of return on the total value of the company's property. Neither could
more than a fair return be demanded, if the company had the misfortune
to be compelled to pay more than 7% per cent. for money borrowed. The
only testimony as to the local rate of returns required for such investments
at Minneapolis at that time shows that 8 per cent. would be required."
Ibid. 830.
This is the first and only case in those we have reviewed in which the
court has said anything to indicate that the rate at which a company may
borrow upon its bonds is not to be considered in determining the over-all
rate. The reasoning of the court is not persuasive. It says, if the com-
pany were free from debt, the argument would not be of force. But this
loses sight of the tests for determining the reasonableness of the rate stated
so frequently by the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, this decision
was rendered in 1923, before the decision in the Pacific case.
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